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Abstract—It is known that Tardos’s collusion-secure proba-
bilistic fingerprinting code (Tardos code; STOC’03) has length
of theoretically minimal order with respect to the number of
colluding users. However, Tardos code uses certain continuous
probability distribution in codeword generation, which creates
some problems for practical use, in particular, it requires large
extra memory. A solution proposed so far is to use some finite
probability distributions instead. In this paper, we determine the
optimal finite distribution in order to decrease extra memory
amount. By our result, the extra memory is reduced to 1/32 of
the original, or even becomes needless, in some practical setting.
Moreover, the code length is also reduced, e.g. to about 20.6%
of Tardos code asymptotically. Finally, we address some other
practical issues such as approximation errors which are inevitable
in any real implementation.
Index Terms—Collusion-secure code, Tardos code, memory
optimization, digital rights managements
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT progress in information technology has enabledus to handle easily commercial objects (such as movies,
musics, customers’ data) in a digital form. This increased
our convenience dramatically, however as the amount of such
digital contents constantly grows, information leakage and
counterfeiting, in particular those caused by authorized users,
have become a serious concern. Prevention of such illegal
copying is often difficult by either technological or social
reason. An alternative solution is to embed user identification
information into each content by watermarking technique,
making the guilty user (called a “pirate”) traceable from the
leaked content without decreasing convenience for innocent
users too much. For this purpose, it was pointed out ([1])
that the embedded information should be designed securely
against “collusion-attacks”, that is a kind of modification
of embedded information by a group of pirates. A c-secure
code provides such identification information which is secure
against c pirates or less.
It is known that Tardos’s probabilistic c-secure code [12]
(Tardos code) has length of theoretically minimal order among
all possible c-secure codes with respect to c. The frequency
of 0s and 1s in the codewords is decided by outputs of
K. Nuida, M. Hagiwara and H. Watanabe are with Research Center
for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial
Science and Technology (AIST), Japan.
H. Imai is also with AIST-RCIS, and is with Faculty of Scientific Engi-
neering, Chuo University, Japan.
This paper is the full version of the authors’ work presented in: 9th
Information Hiding, Saint-Malo, France, June 13, 2007.
This study has been sponsored by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry, Japan (METI) under contract, New-generation Information Security
R&D Program, and by JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research.
certain probability distribution, which is referred to as the
bias distribution in this paper. Tardos’s work is a milestone in
this research area because of the theoretical impact, however
there are some hurdles for practical implementation, due to
the property that Tardos’s bias distributions are continuous. An
explicit implementation of continuous distributions would be
impossible, while effects of approximation of bias distributions
on the security performance have not yet been evaluated.
Moreover, (approximated values of) the outputs of the bias
distribution, which should be of high accuracy to make the
code c-secure, are supposed to be recorded throughout. Thus
large amount of extra memory is required for a practical use.
A simple solution is to replace the continuous bias distri-
butions with finite ones. For instance, a bias distribution with
4 possible outputs needs only 2 bits of memory to record one
output, i.e. to record “which of the four”. This solution was
first explored by Hagiwara, Hanaoka and Imai in [6]; they
established a formula of sufficient code length in terms of
a given (finite) bias distribution and desired security perfor-
mance. They also proposed a “c-indistinguishability” condition
for suitable bias distributions, with three concrete examples
that reduce the code lengths to about 60% of Tardos codes.
However, it has not yet been discussed whether their choice of
bias distributions is optimal for the purpose of reducing extra
memory amount. Moreover, a problem concerning practical
implementation is left unsolved as well: their code requires
calculation of some “score” of each user, which cannot be
explicitly representable in general by usual number systems
on computers (e.g. floating-point numbers), however effects
of approximation of scores have not been evaluated so far.
The aim of this paper is to solve the abovementioned prob-
lems. First, we exhibit a strong evidence that the code lengths
decrease substantially due to c-indistinguishability condition.
Thus, we may restrict our attention to bias distributions
satisfying this condition. Secondly, we determine the set of c-
indistinguishable bias distributions, together with the set of the
optimal ones among them (namely, those with minimal number
of possible outputs). We show that the optimal distribution
has only ⌈c/2⌉ possible outputs, where ⌈x⌉ denotes as usual
the smallest integer n with x ≤ n; thus only ⌈log2⌈c/2⌉⌉-
bits memory are required to record one output. (Table I
gives a numerical example, where bias distributions for Tardos
codes are approximated by single-precision binary floating-
point numbers.) This shows that our result reduces the extra
memory amount significantly; in particular, it even makes such
extra memory needless when c = 2. Moreover, we improve
the code length formula in [6] to reduce code lengths further
and to evaluate effects of approximation of users’ scores. The
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Fig. 1. Ratio of code lengths relative to Tardos codes
combination of our new formula and our optimal distributions
provides much shorter code lengths than Tardos codes and than
[6] (see Figure 1). We also investigate the asymptotic behavior
of our code length; the ratio of our code length relative to
Tardos code converges to about 20.6% as c→∞.
TABLE I
A COMPARISON OF REQUIRED EXTRA MEMORY AMOUNT
Case 1: 2 pirates, 200 users, error probability ≤ 10−11 .
Case 2: 4 pirates, 400 users, error probability ≤ 10−11 .
bits / position code length total bits
Tardos 32 12 400 396 800
Case 1 Ours 0 6278 0
% 0 50.6 0
Tardos 32 51 200 1 638 400
Case 2 Ours 1 19750 19750
% 3.1 38.6 1.2
This paper is organized as follows. After some preliminary
(Section II) on the model of c-secure codes, some preceding
works, problems and notations, we observe in Section III
the importance of the c-indistinguishability condition. Section
IV-A shows some properties of c-indistinguishable distribu-
tions; Section IV-B determines the set of c-indistinguishable
distributions; and Section IV-C determines the set of the
optimal distributions. Section V-A gives our improvement
of the code length formula established in [6]; Section V-B
investigates the asymptotic behavior of our code length; and
Section V-C provides some numerical examples. We give
remarks on some recent related works in Section VI. Finally,
Appendices are given and devoted to the proofs of some of
our results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Our Model for Collusion-Secure Codes
In this subsection, we describe our model for collusion-
secure codes. In our model, a content server embeds a binary
codeword wi = (wi,1, . . . , wi,m) of length m into a digital
content, which will be distributed to i-th user ui, by certain
watermarking technique. Pirates, who are the adversarial users
attacking the code, then make an illegal copy of the distributed
content which involves a codeword possibly modified by them.
When the illegally copied content is found, the content server
first extracts the embedded codeword y = (y1, . . . , ym) (called
the pirated codeword). Some bits yj in y may be broken and
hence not decodable; such a bit is denoted by ‘?’. Then the
server executes a tracing algorithm for detecting the pirates,
with the y and all the wis as input.
Regarding the attack model, we assume that ℓ pirates try to
detect the positions of (parts of) the embedded codeword from
differences of their contents, and then to modify bits of the
codeword in these positions by some (possibly probabilistic)
algorithm, called a pirates’ strategy. This attack model is
formulated as the following assumption, which was originally
introduced in [1] and has been adopted in most of the
preceding works (e.g. [1], [6], [12]):
Assumption 1 (Marking Assumption): If all the bits
wi1,j , . . . , wiℓ,j in codewords of the pirates ui1 , . . . , uiℓ at
the same, say j-th position coincide (we call such a position
undetectable), then yj = wi1,j .
Moreover, we also put the following assumption:
Assumption 2 (Pirates’ Knowledge): Pirates have no infor-
mation on the actual choice of innocent (i.e. non-pirate) users’
codewords, other than their a priori distribution which may be
publicly known. As a result, the choice of y is independent of
those codewords.
To discuss the security performance of our codes, we fix the
meaning of the following terms: false-negative means that the
tracing algorithm outputted no pirates; false-positive means
that the tracing algorithm outputted at least one innocent
user; tracing error means that false-negative or false-positive
(or possibly both) occurs. A code equipped with a tracing
algorithm is called c-secure (with ε-error) if the tracing error
probability is bounded by a negligibly small value ε provided
the number of pirates is at most c.
B. Tardos Code and Its Generalization
In this subsection we summarize the code construction
and tracing algorithms of c-secure Tardos code [12] and its
generalization given in [6] as follows. First, the content server
is supposed to choose the random values 0 < p(j) < 1
independently for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m, according to a given
probability distribution P which we refer to as the bias
distribution. (Details for the choices of P in these codes are
irrelevant here and hence omitted; see the original papers for
details.) Here we only treat the bias distributions whose output
values are in the open interval (0, 1) and which are symmetric
in the following sense; we have
Prob((P’s output) ∈ A) = Prob((P’s output) ∈ 1−A)
for any subset A of the interval (0, 1), where Prob signifies the
probability and 1−A = {1−a | a ∈ A}. (When P is finite, it is
symmetric in this sense if and only if it outputs a and 1−a with
the same probability for any a.) The resulting sequence P =
(p(1), . . . , p(m)) should be stored and be kept secret throughout
3the scheme: due to Assumption 2, pirates may be allowed to
guess the values p(j) from public information on P and the
pirates’ codewords, but not to know about the actual choices
of p(j). Then, secondly, the server chooses each codeword wi
in the following probabilistic manner: Prob(wi,j = 1) = p(j)
and Prob(wi,j = 0) = 1− p(j) for j-th position. All the bits
wi,j are supposed to be independently chosen.
In the tracing algorithm, the server calculates a score Si of
each user ui by Si =
∑m
j=1 S
(j)
i , where
S
(j)
i =

σ(p(j)) if (yj , wi,j) = (1, 1) ,
−σ(1 − p(j)) if (yj , wi,j) = (1, 0) ,
0 if yj ∈ {0, ?} ,
with σ(p) =
√
(1− p)/p for 0 < p < 1. The output of the
tracing algorithm is then the (possibly empty) list of all users
ui with Si ≥ Z , where Z is a suitably selected threshold
parameter. Details of the choices of Z are also omitted here.
C. Problems
A problem of Tardos code is, as we mentioned in the
Introduction, that the bias distribution P used in his codeword
generation is continuous. An explicit implementation of such
a P seems to be impossible. Moreover, even if we would
like to approximate this P , e.g. by floating-point numbers,
the original security proof does not concern effects of such
inevitable approximation; and large amount of extra memory
is required to record the approximated values of P since these
values should be of high accuracy to make the code c-secure.
A solution proposed in [6] is to use suitable finite bias
distributions instead. They gave formulae of code length
and threshold parameter corresponding to a given finite bias
distribution P , making the code c-secure. Moreover, by ob-
serving the form of their formula, they also proposed a “c-
indistinguishability” condition for P which would be effective
to reduce the code lengths.
However, regarding abovementioned memory problem, the
following question remained open: Is their choice of P optimal
in terms of required memory? Moreover, although the users’
scores are irrational numbers in general, effects of approxima-
tion of scores on the tracing error probability has not yet been
discussed. In the rest of this paper, we give solutions for these
problems.
D. Notations
This subsection summarizes some notations used throughout
this paper. First, let the following expression
{(val, prob) | cond}
signify the probability distribution such that a value val is
taken with probability prob, where val and prob vary subject
to the condition cond. Given a finite bias distribution P , let
p0, p1, . . . , pk denote the possible outputs in increasing order
and write qi = Prob(P outputs pi); thus pk−i = 1 − pi and
qk−i = qi by the symmetry of P . For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c and 0 ≤ x ≤
ℓ, define functions fℓ,x(p) and gℓ,x(p) for 0 < p < 1 by
fℓ,x(p) = p
x(1− p)ℓ−x(xσ(p)− (ℓ − x)σ(1 − p)) ,
gℓ,x(p) = xp
x−1(1− p)ℓ−x − (ℓ − x)px(1− p)ℓ−x−1 ,
where
σ(p) =
√
(1− p)/p .
These two functions satisfy the following relation fℓ,x(p) =
gℓ,x(p)
√
p(1− p). Put
Rℓ,x = max{0, Ep [fℓ,x(p)]} ,
where Ep signifies the expected value over outputs p of P .
Define a function r(t) by
r(t) = (et − 1− t)/t2 for t > 0 ,
and let
Rℓ,P = Ep [−fℓ,0(p)]−
ℓ−1∑
x=1
(
ℓ
x
)
Rℓ,x for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c .
Moreover, log = loge denotes the natural logarithm, and ⌈x⌉
denotes the smallest integer n such that n ≥ x.
III. A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
c-INDISTINGUISHABILITY
Before solving the problems mentioned in Section II-C, we
investigate the c-indistinguishability condition for bias distri-
butions proposed in [6]. This condition was introduced for the
purpose of reducing code lengths determined by the formula
given in [6]; however, it has not yet been discovered how
much this condition contributes to decreasing the true tracing
error probability (and hence to reducing the code length). This
section exhibits a strong evidence that this condition is in fact
substantial for decreasing the error probability.
First, we recall from [6] the following definition of the c-
indistinguishability condition (see Section II-D for notations):
Definition 1: A (finite) bias distribution P is called c-
indistinguishable, or c-ind in short, if
∑ℓ−1
x=1
(
ℓ
x
)
Rℓ,x = 0 for
all 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c.
Remark 1: Since the value Rℓ,x is always nonnegative
by definition, this condition is equivalent to Rℓ,x = 0 (or
equivalently, Ep [fℓ,x(p)] ≤ 0) for all 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c and
1 ≤ x ≤ ℓ− 1.
Then we show that all attack strategies have the same
efficiency on average if and only if P is c-ind. This claim
implies a substantial significance of the c-ind condition.
We start with an arbitrary finite bias distribution P . Let
u1, . . . , uℓ (where ℓ ≤ c) be the pirates and w1, . . . , wℓ
their codewords. The pirates would hope none of them being
outputted by the tracing algorithm, therefore they would try to
create the pirated codeword y so that all of their scores will
be as small as possible. For this purpose, it is necessary for
the sum S of their scores to be small. By the definition of
the tracing algorithm, S can be decomposed as S = S′ + S′′,
where S′ denotes the sum of pirates’ bitwise scores over the
undetectable positions, which is independent of the pirates’
4strategy due to Marking Assumption (Assumption 1), and S′′
is the sum over the remaining positions j with yj = 1.
Now for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}, let BI denote
the event that wi,j = 1 for i ∈ I and wi,j = 0 for i 6∈ I ,
and let B′I be the event that BI occurs and yj = 1. Then
the contribution of j-th position of their codewords for S′′
under the event B′I (where I 6= ∅ and I 6= {1, . . . , ℓ}) is
xσ(p(j))−(ℓ−x)σ(1−p(j)), where x = |I|. Thus its expected
value conditioned on B′I over the choices of p(j) is given by∑
p
Prob(p(j) = p | B′I)
(
xσ(p) − (ℓ− x)σ(1 − p)) , (1)
where the sum is taken over all possible outputs p of P .
Under this setting, our claim is expressed as the following
proposition, whose proof is postponed until the end of Section
IV-A since it requires some results given in that section:
Proposition 1: The expected value (1) is always 0 if and
only if P is c-indistinguishable.
Based on this observation, we restrict our attention to c-ind
bias distributions from now on.
IV. THE OPTIMAL BIAS DISTRIBUTION
A. Properties of the c-Indistinguishability Condition
In this subsection, we investigate properties of the c-
indistinguishability condition as a preliminary for the follow-
ing sections. Proofs will be given in Appendix A.
Let P be a (finite) bias distribution. First, a straightforward
observation can show that gℓ,ℓ−x(p) = −gℓ,x(1 − p) and
fℓ,ℓ−x(p) = −fℓ,x(1 − p), therefore by symmetry of P we
have
Ep [fℓ,ℓ−x(p)] = −Ep [fℓ,x(1 − p)] = −Ep [fℓ,x(p)] . (2)
This infers the following result concerning the case when a
bias distribution becomes c-ind:
Proposition 2: Let P be a (finite) bias distribution.
1) P is c-ind if and only if
Ep [fℓ,x(p)] = 0 (3)
for any 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c and 1 ≤ x ≤ ℓ− 1.
2) If ℓ is even, then (3) always holds for x = ℓ/2. In
particular, P is always 2-ind (cf. [6, Proposition 1]).
3) Condition (3) holds for an ℓ and x = x0 if and only if
(3) holds for this ℓ and x = ℓ− x0.
The following recursive relations for fℓ,x and gℓ,x are key
ingredients of our argument in this section:
Lemma 1: We have fℓ−1,x(p) = fℓ,x(p) + fℓ,x+1(p) and
gℓ−1,x(p) = gℓ,x(p) + gℓ,x+1(p) for 0 ≤ x ≤ ℓ− 1.
From this lemma, we derive the following properties. First,
the next proposition says that the c-ind condition simplify the
value Rℓ,P and makes it positive:
Proposition 3: If P is a c-ind distribution, then we have
Rℓ,P = Ep
[√
p(1− p)
]
> 0 for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c.
Secondly, the next lemma reduces the complexity to deter-
mine whether a given bias distribution is c-ind:
Lemma 2: If the condition (3) is satisfied for any two of
the three pairs of parameters (ℓ, x) = (ℓ′ − 1, x′), (ℓ′, x′)
and (ℓ′, x′ + 1), then this condition is also satisfied for the
remaining one.
Now we are able to prove the following result, which can
be seen as a generalization of [6, Proposition 1] since any bias
distribution is 1-ind by definition:
Proposition 4: If c is odd, then any c-ind bias distribution
is also (c+ 1)-ind.
Moreover, the following criterion of the c-ind condition is
deduced from the above results:
Proposition 5: Let c ≥ 3, and let c′ denote the largest odd
number such that c′ ≤ c.
1) If (3) is satisfied for all parameters of the form (ℓ, x) =
(c′, x) with 1 ≤ x ≤ (c′ − 1)/2, then P is c-ind.
2) If P is (c′ − 2)-ind and (3) is satisfied for at least one
parameter of the form (c′, x0) with 1 ≤ x0 ≤ c′−1, then
P is also c-ind. In particular, P is c-ind if for each odd
number ℓ with 3 ≤ ℓ ≤ c′, the condition (3) is satisfied
for at least one parameter of the form (ℓ, xℓ).
At the end of this subsection, we give the postponed proof
of Proposition 1 in Section III:
Proof of Proposition 1: First, since the value p(j) is
assumed to be secret for the pirates, the conditional probability
Prob(yj = 1 | BI ∧ (p(j) = p)) is constant on outputs p of
P , which is equal to Prob(yj = 1 | BI). On the other hand,
we have
Prob(BI | p(j) = p) = px(1− p)ℓ−x
by the codeword generation. Thus by putting
C = Prob(yj = 1 | BI)/Prob(B′I) ,
we have
Prob(p(j) = p | B′I) = C · Prob((p(j) = p) ∧ BI)
= C · Prob(p(j) = p)px(1− p)ℓ−x
since B′I = (BI ∧ (yj = 1)), therefore (1) is equal to
C
∑
p
Prob(p(j) = p)fℓ,x(p) = C ·Ep [fℓ,x(p)] .
Thus by Proposition 2, this value is always 0 regardlessly of
the pirates’ strategy if and only if P is c-ind.
B. Determining c-Indistinguishable Distributions
In this subsection, we determine all the c-ind bias distribu-
tions P for every c, by proving in Theorem 1 below that the
c-ind bias distributions are in one-to-one correspondence with
objects defined as follows:
Definition 2: We refer to a pair Q = (X,ω) of a finite
subset X of the open interval (−1, 1) and a positive function
ω > 0 on X as a quadrature system, or a QS in short, of
degree d if we have∫ 1
−1
F (t)dt =
∑
ξ∈X
ω(ξ)F (ξ) (4)
for any real polynomial F (t) of degree less than or equal to d.
We refer to the size |X | of X as the order of Q, and we say
5that Q is symmetric if −X = X (where −X = {−ξ | ξ ∈ X})
and ω(−ξ) = ω(ξ) for all ξ ∈ X .
Example 1: Let X = {0,±√15/5}, ω(0) = 8/9 and
ω(±√15/5) = 5/9. Then a direct calculation can verify that
(4) holds for any F (t) of degree less than or equal to 5. Thus
(X,ω) is a symmetric QS of order 3 and degree 5 in the sense
of Definition 2.
Now we give the aforementioned theorem on the one-to-one
correspondence as follows, which will be proved in Appendix
B:
Theorem 1: For each c, the c-ind bias distributions are in
one-to-one correspondence with the symmetric QSs of degree
c− 1. More precisely:
• For a symmetric QS Q = (X,ω) of degree c− 1, define
a probability distribution P(Q) by
P(Q) =
{(
1 + ξ
2
,
ω(ξ)
C
√
1− ξ2
)
| ξ ∈ X
}
(see Section II-D for notation), where we put C =∑
ξ∈X ω(ξ)/
√
1− ξ2.
• For a c-ind bias distribution P = {(pi, qi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k},
define a pair Q(P) = ({ξ1, . . . , ξk}, ω) by putting, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k,
ξi = 2pi − 1 and ω(ξi) =
√
pi(1− pi)qi
C′
,
where we put C′ =
∑k
i=1
√
pi(1− pi)qi/2.
Then P(Q) is c-ind, Q(P) is a symmetric QS of degree c−1,
Q(P(Q)) = Q and P(Q(P)) = P .
Remark 2: Note that any symmetric QS of even degree 2d
is also a QS of degree 2d + 1 by the definition of QSs.
This fact corresponds to Proposition 4 via the one-to-one
correspondence in Theorem 1.
C. The Optimal c-Indistinguishable Distribution
Among the c-ind bias distributions, in this subsection we
determine the optimal ones for the purpose of reducing extra
memory amount. Owing to Proposition 4, we may concentrate
our attention on the case when c is even.
First, as we mentioned in the Introduction, the optimal c-
ind distributions are precisely the ones with minimal number
of possible outputs. By Theorem 1, such c-ind distributions
correspond to the symmetric QSs of degree c−1 with minimal
order; thus our task here is to determine those QSs. However,
in fact the solution of this problem has been given (in different
terminology) as the following classical result:
Theorem 2 (e.g. [3], [11]): For ν ≥ 1, let
Lν(t) =
1
2νν!
(
d
dt
)ν
(t2 − 1)ν
be the ν-th Legendre polynomial normalized as Lν(1) = 1. Let
X be the set of zeroes of Lν(t) (i.e. values x with Lν(x) = 0),
and put
ω(ξ) =
2
(1− ξ2)Lν ′(ξ)2 for ξ ∈ X
(see [3, Section 7.3.1, p.316] for the expression of ω(ξ)). Then
Qν = (X,ω) is the unique symmetric QS of minimal order
subject to the degree being 2ν − 1; namely, it is a symmetric
QS of order ν and degree 2ν−1, while no other QS of degree
2ν − 1 has order less than or equal to ν.
For instance, Q3 is the QS shown in Example 1. We refer
to the QS Qν defined in this theorem as the Gauss-Legendre
QS, or the GL QS in short, because of its deep relationship to
the “Gauss-Legendre quadrature formula”, that is a classical
approximation method for integral (see e.g. [11]). Now by
combining Theorems 1 and 2, we determine the optimal
bias distribution (which we refer to as the Gauss-Legendre
distribution, or the GL distribution in short) explicitly as
follows:
Theorem 3: For ν ≥ 1, let
L˜ν(t) =
(
d
du
)ν
(u2 − 1)ν
∣∣∣∣
u=2t−1
,
a polynomial in t of degree ν. Then the unique optimal (2ν)-
ind distribution P = P2ν is given by{(
p,
C
(p(1 − p))3/2L˜ν ′(p)2
) ∣∣∣∣∣ L˜ν(p) = 0
}
(see Section II-D for notation), where C is the normalizing
constant adjusting the total probability to 1. This P2ν has ν
possible outputs.
The proof of this theorem will be given in Appendix C.
Table II shows the explicit GL distributions for small c, where
the output values less than 1/2 are omitted by symmetry.
Remark 3: By Theorem 3, the optimal c-ind distribution Pc
has ⌈c/2⌉ possible outputs, therefore only ⌈log2⌈c/2⌉⌉-bits
of memory are sufficient to record one value p(j) (whenever
a relatively small table of possible outputs of Pc is held
together). As we mentioned in the Introduction, some com-
parison of the required memory amount between Tardos code
and ours is shown in Table I above, where we put c = 2,
N = 200 and ε = 10−11 in Case 1, and c = 4, N = 400
and ε = 10−11 in Case 2. Here the code lengths of our
codes are calculated by using a formula given in the next
section; and we assume that outputs of Tardos’s continuous
bias distributions are approximated by using single-precision
(4-bytes) floating-point numbers. The table shows that our
optimal bias distributions in fact reduce the memory amount
dramatically. Note that our optimal distributions require 4-
bytes of memory or more to record one output in the (very
impractical) case c ≥ 232 + 1 = 4 294 967 297. However,
for such c, the approximation of Tardos’s distributions require
much larger memory in order to attain comparable security.
V. CODE LENGTHS
A. An Improved Formula for Code Lengths
In this subsection, we improve the formula for code lengths
and thresholds given in [6] to reduce code lengths. Also, we
slightly modify the tracing algorithm to evaluate the effects
of approximation of users’ scores. Here we do not assume
that the bias distribution P is the optimal one determined in
the previous section, since it is generally inevitable in practical
implementation to perform some approximation of the optimal
bias distribution (cf. Table II).
6TABLE II
THE OPTIMAL c-IND DISTRIBUTIONSPc
c L˜(t) value probability
2 2(2t − 1) 1/2 1
4 8(6t2 − 6t + 1) 1/2 +
√
3/6 1/2
6 48(2t − 1)(10t2 − 10t + 1) 1/2 (20
√
10− 32)/93
1/2 +
√
15/10 (125 − 20
√
10)/186
8 384(70t4 − 140t3 + 90t2 − 20t + 1) 1/2 +
√
525− 70
√
30/70 1/4 + (41
√
30 − 49
√
21)/12
1/2 +
√
525 + 70
√
30/70 1/4 − (41
√
30 − 49
√
21)/12
Before stating our results, we prepare further notations (see
also Section II-D). Let δ ≥ 0 be a bound of approximation
error of users’ bitwise scores, and let Ui be an approximated
value of σ(pi) for 0 ≤ i ≤ k; namely |Ui − σ(pi)| ≤ δ. Let
R be a positive value such that
R ≤ min
1≤ℓ≤c
Rℓ,P , (5)
and let ψ1, ψ2 > 0 be approximated values of σ(p0) such that
ψ1 ≤ σ(p0) ≤ ψ2 . (6)
Let η1, η2 > 0 be two positive parameters, and let x1, x2 > 0
be two positive values such that
xir(xi) ≤ ηiRψ1/c , for i = 1, 2 . (7)
Note that tr(t) is an increasing positive function for t > 0.
Note also that the code length given by our formula below
will be reduced as the inequalities (5), (6) and (7) are getting
stricter. Moreover, choose values A1 and A2 so that, for i =
1, 2,
Ai ≥ c
(1− η1 − η2/c)R− 2δc ·
ψ2
xi
log
1
εi
, (8)
where ε1 and ε2 are given security parameters related to the
tracing error probability. Note also that the code length will
be decreased as the inequality (8) becomes stricter.
Now we define an “approximated version” of the tracing
algorithm by the following modification:
Definition 3 (approximated tracing algorithm): We modify
the tracing algorithm given in Section II-B as follows. First,
the approximated score Ŝi of i-th user ui is calculated by
Ŝi =
∑m
j=1 Ŝ
(j)
i , where
Ŝ
(j)
i =

Uνj if (yj , wi,j) = (1, 1) ,
−Uk−νj if (yj , wi,j) = (1, 0) ,
0 if yj ∈ {0, ?} ,
with the index νj defined by p(j) = pνj . (Note that |Ŝi −
Si| ≤ mδ where Si denotes the true score of ui.) Then our
approximated algorithm outputs all users whose approximated
score satisfies that Ŝi ≥ Z .
Remark 4: Note that the original tracing algorithm is re-
covered when we take Uν = σ(pν) for every ν.
Now sufficient code lengths and corresponding thresholds
with respect to the approximated tracing algorithm are de-
termined by the following theorem, which will be proved in
Appendix D:
Theorem 4: Choose the code length m and the threshold Z
by
m = A1 +A2 , (9)
Z =
((
1− η2
c
) R
c
− δ
)
A1 +
(
η1R
c
+ δ
)
A2 (10)
(see above for choices of the auxiliary values), and let N
denote the total number of users. Then for the approximated
tracing algorithm given in Definition 3, the false-positive
probability is less than 1− (1 − ε1)N−1 (≤ (N − 1)ε1); and
the false-negative probability is less than ε2. Hence the total
tracing error probability is bounded by (N − 1)ε1+ ε2, which
becomes ε if we set ε1 = ε2 = ε/N .
Remark 5: Even if the value Rℓ,x or Rℓ,P is not explicitly
representable on a computer’s numeric system, all values R,
ψi and xi can be chosen as being explicitly representable.
Moreover, A1 and A2, therefore the resulting code length, can
be chosen from integers.
Here we propose the following choice of parameters
(η1, η2) = (1/2,
√
c/2) (11)
to reduce the code length. On the other hand, the original
formula in [6] can be recovered by putting δ = 0, η1 = 1/4
and η2 = c/2 and by letting all of (5), (6), (7) and (8) be
equalities.
Remark 6: Although it is somewhat complicated to com-
pute the explicit GL distribution for large c, we can determine
values R, ψ1 and ψ2 in (5) and (6) by using inequalities
(12), (31) and (32) which will be given in Section V-B and
Appendix G; thus we are still able to derive some upper
bounds for the code lengths even in such cases. Namely, if
we put δ = 0, then a sufficient code length m making the
code c-secure is calculated from the above values R, ψ1 and
ψ2 as m = A
′
1c
2 log(1/ε1) +A
′
2c
2 log(1/ε2), where
A′i =
π
(1 − η1 − η2/c)(c+ 1)xi tan(j1/
√
(c+ 1)2 + a′2)
for i = 1, 2 (see Section V-B and Appendix G for definitions
of j1 and a′2). By choosing security parameters ε1 = ε2 =
ε/N as in the last statement of Theorem 4, the percentage
of our code length m relative to the length 100c2⌈log(N/ε)⌉
of Tardos code is bounded by A′1 + A′2. Figure 1 above is
thus obtained by plotting the values A′1+A′2, where the lower
and the upper curves correspond, respectively, to our choice
(11) of parameters and the parameters (η1, η2) = (1/4, c/2)
recovering the code length formula given in [6].
7B. Asymptotic Behavior of Code Lengths
In this subsection, we investigate properties of the GL
distributions P = Pc with c even and the asymptotic behavior
of the corresponding code length determined by our formula
in the limit c→∞. Proofs of results which are omitted here
will be demonstrated in the Appendices.
First, we show the following bound and asymptotic behavior
for the values Rℓ,Pc , whose proofs will be given in Appendix
F:
Proposition 6: We have
Rℓ,Pc ≥
c+ 1
cπ
for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c , (12)
and limc→∞Rℓ,Pc = 1/π for all ℓ ≥ 1.
Secondly, we are also able to show an asymptotic behavior
of the value σ(p0). Here we define j1 to be the small-
est positive zero of the 0th-order Bessel function J0(t) =∑∞
i=0(−1)i(t/2)2i/(i!)2 of the first kind; it is known that
j1 = 2.404 82 · · · . Now the asymptotic behavior of σ(p0) is
given as follows, which will be proved in Appendix G:
Proposition 7: We have limc→∞ σ(p0)/c = 1/j1.
From now, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the
code length corresponding to Pc. Here, for simplicity, we
put δ = 0, let (5), (6), (7) and (8) be equalities, and
choose parameters η1 and η2 so that limc→∞ η1 = η with
0 < η < ∞, limc→∞ η2 = ∞ and limc→∞ η2/c = η′ with
0 ≤ η′ <∞. Moreover, we assume for a technical reason that
log(1/ε2)/ log(1/ε1) does not diverge to ∞ when c → ∞.
Then we have the following result, which will be proved in
Appendix H:
Theorem 5: Under the above assumptions, the code length
given by (9) is asymptotically
m ∼ π
(1− η − η′)j1x∞ c
2 log
1
ε1
when c→∞ ,
where x∞ is the unique positive value determined by
x∞r(x∞) = η/(πj1).
By applying this theorem to our proposal (11) of the
parameters η1 and η2, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 6: Put (η1, η2) = (1/2,
√
c/2) and assume that
log(1/ε2)/ log(1/ε1) does not diverge to ∞ when c → ∞.
Then our code length is less than 20.6021% of that of Tardos
code for any sufficiently large c.
Proof: In this case, we have η = 1/2 and η′ = 0. By
using the relations 3.141 59 < π < 3.141 60 and 2.404 82 <
j1 < 2.404 83, we have
x∞r(x∞) = (2πj1)
−1 > 0.066 18 ,
therefore it follows that x∞ > 0.126 82 (recall that tr(t) is an
increasing function on t > 0). By these data and Theorem 5,
the percentage of our code length relative to Tardos code is
asymptotically
π
(1− η − η′)j1x∞ <
3.141 60
(1/2) · 2.404 82 · 0.126 82 < 20.6021 .
Thus the percentage is less than 20.6021% for any sufficiently
large c.
A similar argument can be used to show that the asymp-
totic percentage is slightly less than 80.7028% when we use
the parameters (η1, η2) = (1/4, c/2) corresponding to the
formula in [6]; in this case, we have η = 1/4, η′ = 1/2,
x∞r(x∞) = (4πj1)
−1 > 0.033 09 and x∞ > 0.064 75. Thus
the asymptotic behavior of our code is much better not only
compared to Tardos code but also to [6].
C. Numerical Examples
Here we give some numerical examples of our code lengths
and related parameters. We use the bias distributions given
in the first part of Table III, which approximate the GL
distributions, with c ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}. We choose approximated
bitwise scores Ui as in the second part of Table III, with
approximation error δ = 0 if c = 2 and δ = 10−5 if
c ∈ {4, 6, 8}. Then Table IV gives corresponding values of
R, ψ1, ψ2, x1, x2, A1 and A2, where we put ε1 = ε2 = ε/N ,
N = 100c, ε = 10−11, η1 = 1/2 and η2 =
√
c/2. Now
by (9) and (10), we obtain the resulting code lengths m
and thresholds Z as in Table IV, where the row ‘%’ shows
percentages of our code lengths relative to Tardos codes.
On the other hand, based on results in Section V-B, further
comparison of our code lengths with those of Tardos code is
given by Table V, where we put ε1 = ε2 = ε/N , N = 109
and ε = 10−6.
TABLE III
BIAS DISTRIBUTIONSP AND APPROXIMATED SCORES
c p q c p q
2 0.500 00 1.000 00 8 0.069 43 0.248 33
4 0.211 32 0.500 00 0.330 01 0.251 67
0.788 68 0.500 00 0.669 99 0.251 67
6 0.112 70 0.332 01 0.930 57 0.248 33
0.500 00 0.335 98
0.887 30 0.332 01
c U0 U1 U2 U3
2 1
4 1.931 87 0.517 63
6 2.805 90 1 0.356 39
8 3.661 01 1.424 85 0.701 82 0.273 14
These examples show that our result in this paper indeed
reduces the code lengths.
VI. REMARKS ON RECENT RELATED WORKS
At the time when the preliminary version of this paper
was written, our code lengths given in Section V were to
our best knowledge the shortest among known c-secure codes
(at least for c ≥ 4). After that, some recent works [7], [8],
[9], [10] on Tardos code have succeeded to reduce the code
lengths, by strictly improving the evaluation of tracing error
probabilities and slightly modifying some parameters or even
the tracing algorithm itself; their new code lengths are in
fact shorter than ours. However, in their works, the problems
such as large memory amount and impossibility of explicit
implementation, mentioned and solved in this paper, are not
concerned. For instance, their schemes still use continuous bias
distributions but they did not show suitable ways to implement
or approximate their continuous distributions for practical use.
Therefore, these recent results do not completely supersede
the work in this paper, in particular, the most significant part
8TABLE IV
AUXILIARY VALUES, LENGTHS AND THRESHOLDS FOR THE EXAMPLE
c 2 4 6 8
N 200 400 600 800
Tardos n 12 400 51 200 115 200 211 200
R 0.5 0.408 0.377 0.362
ψ1 1 1.931 2.805 3.661
ψ2 1 1.932 2.806 3.662
x1 0.231 0.184 0.166 0.155
x2 0.315 0.347 0.377 0.406
A1 3622 12 907 28 878 51 783
A2 2656 6843 12 716 19 769
Ours n 6278 19750 41594 71552
% 50.6 38.6 36.1 33.9
Z 917.3 · · · 1336.317 86 1843.450 24 · · · 2375.914 48 · · ·
TABLE V
ANOTHER COMPARISON OF CODE LENGTHS FOR N = 109 AND ε = 10−6
c 4 8 16 32 64 →∞
Tardos 5.60× 104 2.24 × 105 8.96× 105 3.58 × 106 1.43× 107 100%
Ours 2.18× 104 7.72 × 104 2.78× 105 1.01 × 106 3.75× 106 20.6%
regarding reduction of extra memory amount. In fact, these
results show that there remains a room for reducing the length
of our code. Indeed, we would like to announce that our
recent successive study has achieved code lengths even shorter
than the abovementioned works, by using (approximation of)
the GL distributions, improving our tracing algorithm, and
tightly evaluating its tracing error probability. The details of
the successive result will be presented in a forthcoming paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the problems of Tardos’s fingerprinting
code [12] regarding its practical use, such as large required
memory and impossibility of explicit implementation, mainly
due to continuity of probability distributions used in its
codeword generation. We investigated the finite probability
distributions used in the preceding improvement [6] of Tardos
code, and determined the optimal distributions for the purpose
of reducing memory amount. As Table I shows, the memory
amount is indeed reduced dramatically by our result. We
also reduced the code lengths significantly by improving the
formula of code lengths given in [6]; and evaluated effects
of approximation on security performance of our codes in a
practical setting.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION IV-A
Here we give the proofs of our results in Section IV-A.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, the following property is
easily derived from (2): Ep [fℓ,ℓ−x(p)] ≥ 0 for all 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c
and 1 ≤ x ≤ ℓ − 1 if and only if Ep [fℓ,x(p)] ≤ 0 for all
2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c and 1 ≤ x ≤ ℓ − 1. Thus the first claim follows
from Remark 1. The other claims are also straightforward by
(2).
Proof of Lemma 1: First, an elementary analysis shows
that
gℓ,x(p) =
d
dp
(
px(1 − p)ℓ−x) , (13)
therefore the second claim follows from the equality
px(1 − p)ℓ−x + px+1(1 − p)ℓ−x−1 = px(1 − p)ℓ−1−x .
Now the first claim is also derived from the relation fℓ,x(p) =
gℓ,x(p)
√
p(1− p).
9Proof of Proposition 3: By the assumption on P , we
have Rℓ,P = Ep [−fℓ,0(p)] for any 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c. Thus Lemma
1 infers that Rℓ,P−Rℓ−1,P = Ep [fℓ,1(p)] for any 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c,
therefore we have Rℓ,P−Rℓ−1,P = 0 by Proposition 2. Hence
Rℓ,P = R1,P = Ep
[√
p(1− p)
]
, as desired.
Proof of Lemma 2: We have Ep [fℓ′−1,x′(p)] =
Ep [fℓ′,x′(p)] + Ep [fℓ′,x′+1(p)] by Lemma 1; thus all of the
three terms become zero whenever any two of them are.
Proof of Proposition 4: Since P is c-ind, Proposition 2
infers that (3) is satisfied for all parameters of the form (ℓ, x)
with 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c and for (c + 1, x0), where x0 = (c + 1)/2.
Thus by Lemma 2 and induction on ν, it follows for all ν
that (3) is satisfied for parameters of the form (c+1, x0± ν).
Hence P is (c+ 1)-ind by Claim 1 of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5: By Proposition 4, it suffices for
both of the two claims to prove that P is c′-ind.
First, we argue the claim 1. By the assumption and Claim 3
of Proposition 2, the condition (3) is satisfied for all parameters
(c′, x) with 1 ≤ x ≤ c′−1, therefore Lemma 2 infers that it is
also satisfied for all parameters (c′−1, x) with 1 ≤ x ≤ c′−2.
Similarly, it is inductively derived that (3) is satisfied for all
parameters (ℓ, x) with 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c′ and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ− 1. Thus P
is c′-ind by Claim 1 of Proposition 2.
Secondly, we prove the claim 2. The assumption and Propo-
sition 4 infer that P is (c′ − 1)-ind, thus (3) is satisfied for
all parameters (c′ − 1, x) with 1 ≤ x ≤ c′ − 2. Since (3) is
satisfied for the parameter (c′, x0) in the statement, the same
argument as Proposition 4 shows that (3) is also satisfied for
all parameters (c′, x) with 1 ≤ x ≤ c′ − 1. Hence P is c′-ind
by Claim 1 of Proposition 2.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Here we give the proof of Theorem 1. First, we show that
P = P(Q) is a c-ind bias distribution for any symmetric QS
Q of degree c−1. A straightforward calculation can show that
this P is indeed a finite probability distribution; the outputs of
P lie in the interval (0, 1) since X is a subset of the interval
(−1, 1); and P is symmetric since Q is symmetric. Thus the
remaining task is, by Claim 2 of Proposition 5, to show that
Ep [fℓ,1(p)] = 0 for all 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c. Now recall the relation
fℓ,1(p) =
√
p(1− p)gℓ,1(p). Since gℓ,1 is a polynomial of
degree ℓ− 1 (≤ c− 1), we have
Ep
[√
p(1− p)gℓ,1(p)
]
=
∑
ξ∈X
√
1 + ξ
2
· 1− ξ
2
gℓ,1
(
1 + ξ
2
)
· ω(ξ)
C
√
1− ξ2
=
1
2C
∑
ξ∈X
ω(ξ)gℓ,1
(
1 + ξ
2
)
=
1
2C
∫ 1
−1
gℓ,1
(
1 + t
2
)
dt (14)
=
1
C
∫ 1
0
gℓ,1(z) dz
= 0 (15)
(here (14) follows since Q is a QS of degree c−1, while (15)
is derived from (13)). Thus P(Q) is c-ind.
Secondly, we show that Q = Q(P) is a symmetric QS of
degree c−1 for any c-ind distribution P . The set X is included
in the interval (−1, 1) since 0 < pi < 1 for all i, while Q is
symmetric since P is symmetric. Thus the remaining task is to
show that
∫ 1
−1 F (t)dt =
∑
ξ∈X ω(ξ)F (ξ) for any polynomial
F (t) of degree less than or equal to c− 1. Now observe that
any such F (t) can be expressed as a linear combination of
the polynomials gℓ,1(1+t2 ) of degree ℓ − 1 for 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c and
a constant polynomial 1, while
∑
i ω(ξi) = 2 =
∫ 1
−1 1 dt by
definition. Thus it suffices to show the above claim only for
F (t) = gℓ,1(
1+t
2 ) with 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c. For this claim, we have
C′
∫ 1
−1
gℓ,1
(
1 + t
2
)
dt = 2C′
∫ 1
0
gℓ,1(z) dz
= 0 (16)
= Ep
[√
p(1− p)gℓ,1(p)
]
(17)
= C′
k∑
i=1
ω(ξi)gℓ,1
(
1 + ξi
2
)
(here (16) is derived from (13), while (17) follows from Claim
1 of Proposition 2). Thus Q(P) is a symmetric QS of degree
c− 1.
Finally, since
∑
ξ∈X ω(ξ) = 2 and
∑
i qi = 1, a straightfor-
ward computation can verify the relations Q(P(Q)) = Q and
P(Q(P)) = P . Hence the proof of Theorem 1 is concluded.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Here we give the proof of Theorem 3. Put
L̂ν(t) = Lν(2t− 1) ,
which is proportional to L˜ν . First, note that L̂ν(1+ξ2 ) = 0
if and only if Lν(ξ) = 0, thus the set of outputs of Pc =
P(Qν) with c = 2ν is (by definition) the set of zeroes of L̂ν ,
which coincides with the set of zeroes of L˜ν and consists of ν
elements (see Theorem 2). Now note that 1− ξ2 = 4p(1− p)
if p = (1 + ξ)/2, while
d
dt
Lν(t)
∣∣∣∣
t=2p−1
=
d
dt
L̂ν
(
1 + t
2
)∣∣∣∣
t=2p−1
=
1
2
(
d
du
L̂ν(u)
∣∣∣∣
u=(1+t)/2
)∣∣∣∣∣
t=2p−1
=
1
2
d
du
L̂ν(u)
∣∣∣∣
u=p
= C′′L˜ν
′(p) ,
where C′′ is some constant. Thus the probability of Pc taking
the value p = (1 + ξ)/2 with ξ ∈ X is
ω(ξ)
C
√
1− ξ2 =
2
C(1 − ξ2)3/2Lν ′(ξ)2
=
1
4CC′′2
(
p(1− p))3/2L˜ν ′(p)2 .
Hence the claim follows, since the factor 1/(4CC′′2) above
is common for all p, concluding the proof.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Here we give the proof of Theorem 4 by evaluating the
probabilities of false-negative and of false-positive. This will
be done by basically the same argument as [6] except for some
slight modifications.
In what follows, let xˆ1 and xˆ2 be two positive parameters,
and put α = xˆ1/σ(p0) and β = xˆ2/(cσ(p0)). Before
giving our proof, we recall the following fundamental tool
in probability theory which is used in our argument (as well
as in [6]):
Lemma 3 (Markov’s Inequality): Let Y be a finite positive
random variable and t > 0. Then we have
Prob(Y > t) <
E [Y ]
t
and Prob(Y ≥ t) ≤ E [Y ]
t
,
where E [Y ] denotes the expected value of Y .
Now we give the following proposition, which is a slight
modification of [6, Lemma 1] and which concerns the false-
positive probability of our code:
Proposition 8 (cf. [6, Lemma 1]): Let ui be an innocent
user. For any fixed P = (p(1), . . . , p(m)), any fixed y =
(y1, . . . , ym) and any t > 0, we have
Prob(Si ≥ t) < er(xˆ1)α
2m−αt , (18)
where the probability is taken over the codewords of ui chosen
according to the P .
Proof: The proof is almost the same as that of [6,
Lemma 1], except for some differences explained below.
First, [6, Lemma 1] showed an inequality similar to (18)
for the probability Prob(Si > Z) under the assumption that
ασ(p0) < xˆ1 (note that xˆ1 is simply denoted by x1 in [6]);
however, the same proof is actually able to prove the same
inequality for a slightly larger probability Prob(Si ≥ Z) under
the weaker assumption that ασ(p0) ≤ xˆ1. This follows from
the observation that the bound 1 + r1α2 ≤ er1α2 used in
the original proof is indeed a strict inequality. Secondly, [6,
Lemma 1] was originally proved only when Z is the threshold,
however a careful reading of the proof can reveal that the
property of Z being the threshold is not used in there; therefore
that proof is still valid even if Z is just an arbitrary positive
parameter. Now our claim follows by combining these two
observations.
Remark 7: The proof of [6, Lemma 1] is still valid (so
is that of the above proposition) even if y is an arbitrary
codeword with yj ∈ {0, 1, ?} which need not satisfy the
Marking Assumption, only the required property of y is that
it is independent of the codeword of ui (see Assumption 2).
On the other hand, the next proposition, which is a slight
modification of [6, Lemma 2], concerns the false-negative
probability:
Proposition 9 (cf. [6, Lemma 2]): Let u1, . . . , uℓ be the pi-
rates with ℓ ≤ c, and t > 0. Then for any fixed pirates’
strategy, we have
E
[
e−β
∑
ℓ
i=1
Si
]
≤ eβ(cβr(xˆ2)−Rℓ,P)m , (19)
where the expected value is taken over all P , all codewords of
pirates and all y, which are chosen according to P , P and the
pirates’ strategy, respectively. Hence by Markov’s Inequality,
we have
Prob(Si < t for all i) ≤ Prob
(
ℓ∑
i=1
Si < ℓt
)
≤ Prob
(
e−β
∑
i
Si > e−βℓt
)
< E
[
e−β
∑
i
Si
]
/e−βℓt
≤ eβ(cβr(xˆ2)−Rℓ,P)m+βℓt .
Proof: The proof is basically the same as [6, Lemma 2];
it also works in our situation by noticing the following points
only. First, the original proof allows the pirates’ strategy to be
probabilistic, though it was not clarified. Secondly, although
[6] only considers the restricted case that y contains no bit
‘?’, an argument appeared in [12] can generalize the proof in
[6] to our situation where y may contain ‘?’.
Now we start to prove Theorem 4. First, recall that in
the approximated tracing algorithm given in Definition 3, a
user is outputted if and only if Ŝ ≥ Z where Ŝ denotes the
approximated score. Now Ŝ ≥ Z infers S ≥ Z − mδ and
Ŝ < Z infers S < Z +mδ by definition of δ; thus to achieve
Prob(ui0 is outputted) < ε1, where ui0 is an arbitrarily fixed
innocent user, and to achieve Prob(no pirate is outputted) <
ε2 as well, it suffices to satisfy the following two bounds
Prob(S ≥ Z −mδ) < ε1 , (20)
Prob(Si < Z +mδ for all i) < ε2 , (21)
where S denotes an arbitrarily fixed innocent user’s true score
and S1, . . . , Sℓ (with ℓ ≤ c) denote the ℓ pirates’ true scores.
Now by Propositions 8 and 9, the following conditions yield
(20) and (21):
r(xˆ1)α
2m− α(Z −mδ) ≤ log ε1 ,
β(cβr(xˆ2)−Rℓ,P)m+ βℓ(Z +mδ) ≤ log ε2 .
Moreover, since the values m, Z , β and δ are all nonnegative,
the following conditions
r(xˆ1)α
2m− α(Z −mδ) = log ε1 , (22)
β(cβr(xˆ2)−R)m+ βc(Z +mδ) = log ε2 (23)
also yield (20) and (21). Now if we solve equations (22)
and (23) in m and Z , where xˆ1 and xˆ2 are determined
by xˆir(xˆi) = σ(p0)ηiR/c for i = 1, 2 and α and β are
determined as above, then the code length m and the threshold
Z are given by
m =
cσ(p0)
C
(
1
xˆ1
log
1
ε1
+
1
xˆ2
log
1
ε2
)
(24)
(where C = (1 − η1 − η2/c)R− 2δc) and
Z =
σ(p0)
C
(
(1− η2/c)R− δc
xˆ1
log
1
ε1
+
η1R+ δc
xˆ2
log
1
ε2
)
(25)
which generalize the formula in [6] (the original is recovered
by putting η1 = 1/4, η2 = c/2 and δ = 0). Moreover, if we
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take the values ψi, xi and Ai (i = 1, 2) as in Section V-A,
and determine the modified code length m̂ and threshold Ẑ
by
m̂ = A1 +A2 , (26)
Ẑ =
((
1− η2
c
) R
c
− δ
)
A1 +
(
η1R
c
+ δ
)
A2 , (27)
then by comparing the pair of (24) and (25) with the pair of
(26) and (27), we can show that conditions (20) and (21) are
satisfied with εi replaced by e−ki where
ki =
C
cσ(p0)
xiAi for i = 1, 2 .
Since ψ2 ≥ σ(p0) and xi ≤ xˆi (i = 1, 2) by definition, we
have e−ki ≤ εi by the choice of Ai. Thus the code length m̂
and threshold Ẑ, which are precisely those chosen in Theorem
4 (see (9) and (10)), provide the desired security performance.
Hence the proof of Theorem 4 is concluded.
APPENDIX E
A LEMMA FOR PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Here we prepare the following well-known fact in elemen-
tary analysis, which will be used in the proof of Proposition
6 given in Appendix F:
Lemma 4: Let {fn}∞n=1 be a sequence of nonnegative con-
tinuous functions on the same open interval I = (a, b),
whose sum
∑∞
n=1 fn converges to a continuous func-
tion f at every point in I . If all of the improper inte-
grals
∫ b
a fn(x) dx and
∫ b
a f(x) dx exist and converge, then
limn→∞
∫ b
a
∑n
i=1 fi(x) dx =
∫ b
a f(x) dx.
From now, we give a proof of this result for the sake of
completeness. In the proof, we use the following two facts,
which can be found in most of undergraduate textbooks of
elementary analysis:
Lemma 5 (Dini’s Theorem; see e.g. [2, p.151]): Let I =
[a, b] be a closed interval, and let {gi}∞i=1 be an increasing
sequence of continuous functions gi on I which converges
to another continuous function g at every point in I; i.e.
gi−1(x) ≤ gi(x) → g(x) when x ∈ I . Then the convergence
is uniform; i.e. for any ε > 0, there is an index n such that
|g(x)− gi(x)| < ε for every i ≥ n and x ∈ I .
Lemma 6 (see e.g. [2, Theorem 10.5]): Let {gi}∞i=1 be a
sequence of continuous functions on the same closed interval
I = [a, b] which converges uniformly to a function g on I .
Then
∫ b
a gi(x) dx converges to
∫ b
a g(x) dx when i→∞.
Now we start to prove Lemma 4. First, note that the
function f is nonnegative on I by the assumption. Then, given
an arbitrary ε > 0, the assumption on convergence of the
improper integral
∫ b
a f(x) dx infers that
0 ≤
∫ b
a
f(x) dx −
∫ b′
a′
f(x) dx <
ε
2
(28)
for some a < a′ ≤ b′ < b. Now by the assumption, the
sequence {gi}∞i=1 defined by gi =
∑i
n=1 fn is an increas-
ing sequence of continuous functions on the closed interval
I ′ = [a′, b′] which converges to the continuous function f at
every point in I ′. Thus Lemma 5 infers that the convergence
is uniform; it follows that
∫ b′
a′
gi(x) dx →
∫ b′
a′
f(x) dx when
i→∞ by Lemma 6. Therefore there is an index n such that∫ b′
a′
f(x) dx−
∫ b′
a′
gi(x) dx <
ε
2
for any i ≥ n . (29)
By combining (28) and (29), we have
0 ≤
∫ b
a
f(x) dx −
∫ b
a
gi(x) dx
≤
∫ b
a
f(x) dx −
∫ b′
a′
gi(x) dx <
ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε
for any i ≥ n (note that 0 ≤ gi ≤ f for each i). This means
that
∫ b
a
gi(x) dx converges to
∫ b
a
f(x) dx when i → ∞, as
desired. Hence the proof of Lemma 4 is concluded.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Here we give the proof of Proposition 6. First, let Qn =
(Xn, ωn) denote the Gauss-Legendre QS of order n (see
Section IV-C for definition), therefore the set Xn consists of
n zeroes of the Legendre polynomial Ln(t). In our proof of
Proposition 6, we use the following result, which is directly
derived from the latter part of Inequality (2.18) in [4, Corollary
1] by choosing the parameter λ = 1/2:
Lemma 7 ([4, Corollary 1]): We have
ωn(ξ)√
1− ξ2 ≤
π
n+ 1/2
for all n ≥ 1 and all ξ ∈ Xn.
Now we start the proof of Proposition 6. Recall that c is
now assumed to be even; put c = 2n. First, by combining
Proposition 3 and Theorem 1, we have
Rℓ,Pc = Ep
[√
p(1− p)
]
=
∑
ξ∈Xn
√
1 + ξ
2
· 1− ξ
2
· ωn(ξ)
Cn
√
1− ξ2
=
1
2Cn
∑
ξ∈Xn
ωn(ξ) =
1
Cn
,
where Cn =
∑
ξ∈Xn
ωn(ξ)/
√
1− ξ2. Now Lemma 7 gives
us that Cn ≤ nπ/(n + 1/2) = cπ/(c + 1), thus the former
claim follows.
For the proof of the latter claim, it suffices to show that
limn→∞ Cn = π. Now it follows that
1√
1− t2 =
∞∑
i=0
1
4i
(
2i
i
)
t2i ≥
n−1∑
i=0
1
4i
(
2i
i
)
t2i
for −1 < t < 1, therefore we have
nπ
n+ 1/2
≥ Cn ≥
∑
ξ∈Xn
ωn(ξ)
n−1∑
i=0
1
4i
(
2i
i
)
ξ2i
=
∫ 1
−1
n−1∑
i=0
1
4i
(
2i
i
)
t2i dt (30)
(here (30) follows from the fact that the QS Qn is of degree
2n − 1). Now owing to Lemma 4 in Appendix E with
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I = (−1, 1) and fi(t) = 4−i
(
2i
i
)
t2i, the value (30) converges
to
∫ 1
−1
∑
i fi(t) dt =
∫ 1
−1
(1 − t2)−1/2 dt = π when n → ∞,
while nπ/(n + 1/2) also converges to π. Thus we have
limn→∞ Cn = π, as desired. Hence the proof of Proposition
6 is concluded.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Here we give the proof of Proposition 7. First, we define
θn to be the unique value such that 0 < θn < π and − cos θn
is the smallest zero of the Legendre polynomial Ln(t) (recall
that the zeroes of Ln(t) lie in the open interval (−1, 1)). Then
we have the following result, which will be used in the proof
of Proposition 7:
Lemma 8 ([5, p.264]): For any n, we have
j1√
(n+ 1/2)2 + a2
< θn <
j1√
(n+ 1/2)2 + a1
,
where a1 = 1/12 and a2 = 1/4− 1/π2.
From now, we prove Proposition 7. First, by the definitions
of p0 and θn, Theorem 1 infers that
p0 =
1− cos θn
2
= sin2
θn
2
,
therefore σ(p0) = 1/ tan(θn/2). Thus by Lemma 8, we have
1
tan(j1/
√
(c+ 1)2 + a′1)
< σ(p0) (31)
<
1
tan(j1/
√
(c+ 1)2 + a′2)
, (32)
where a′i = 4ai (namely a′1 = 1/3 and a′2 = 1 − 4π−2).
Moreover, an elementary analysis gives us
1
c tan(j1/
√
(c+ 1)2 + a′i)
=
cos(j1/
√
(c+ 1)2 + a′i)
j1/
√
(1 + 1/c)2 + a′i/c
2
· j1/
√
(c+ 1)2 + a′i
sin(j1/
√
(c+ 1)2 + a′i)
for i = 1, 2, which converges to 1/j1 when c → ∞. Hence
the claim of Proposition 7 follows, concluding the proof.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Here we give the proof of Theorem 5. First, we have
R = Rℓ,P → 1/π by Proposition 6 (see also Proposition
3) and c−1σ(p0) → 1/j1 by Proposition 7 when c → ∞.
Thus the parameter x1, which is determined by x1r(x1) =
η1Rσ(p0)/c, converges when c→ infty to x∞ given in the
statement (note that the continuous function tr(t) is strictly
increasing for t > 0 and its image is the whole infinite
interval (0,+∞), therefore such x∞ is uniquely determined).
Similarly, the other parameter x2 converges to ∞ when
c → ∞, since x2r(x2) = η2Rσ(p0)/c → ∞. Now by (9),
we have
m
c2 log(1/ε1)
=
1
R(1 − η1 − η2c−1) ·
σ(p0)
c
(
1
x1
+
log(1/ε2)
x2 log(1/ε1)
)
,
while the above argument shows that
R(1 − η1 − η2c−1)→ 1− η − η
′
π
and σ(p0)
c
→ 1
j1
when c → ∞. Moreover, by the assumption on value
log(1/ε2)/ log(1/ε1) we have that
log(1/ε2)
x2 log(1/ε1)
→ 0 when c→∞ .
Thus we have
m
c2 log(1/ε1)
→ π
(1− η − η′)j1x∞ ,
therefore the claim follows. Hence the proof of Theorem 5 is
concluded.
